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ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom argues that unnecessary litigation of low quality
patents hinders innovation, and that the PTO could play a role with its high grant
rates. Accordingly, it is important to answer these questions: (1) which patent
examiners are issuing litigated patents, (2) are examiners who are "rubber
stamping" patents issuing litigatedpatents at a disproportionatelyhigher rate,
and (3) are examiners with less experience issuing more litigated patents? In
sum, do patent examiners who issue litigated patents have common
characteristics?Intuition would argue that those examiners who issue the most
patents (approximately one patent every three business days) would exhibit a
higher litigationrate. Surprisingly, this study suggests that this is wrong.
This study uses two new patent databases that code for nearly 1.7 million
patents and approximately 12,000 patents that were litigated between 2010 and
2011. This study determined that (1) litigatedpatents mainly come from primary
examiners (those examiners with more experience), and (2) primary examiners
with between three to five years of experience and who grant between forty-five
and sixty patents per year are contributing to the litigatedpatent pool at a higher
rate than expected. Interestingly, the highest volume primary examiners
(examiners who on average grant more than eighty patents per year and have
more than eightyears of experience) do better than expected.
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INTRODUCTION

Conventional wisdom argues that unnecessary litigation of low quality
patents is a tax on innovation, and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
could play a role due to high grant rates. 1 Intuition suggests that those

1. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek
Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEC. L.J. 435 (2004); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley &
Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristicsof the Most-Litigated
Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998); Colleen V. Chien,
Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark
Schankerman, Characteristicsof Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J.
EcON. 129 (2001) [hereinafter Lanjouw & Schankerman, Characteristics];Jean 0. Lanjouw
& Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation
with Multiple Indicators, 114 EcON. J. 441 (2004) [hereinafter Lanjouw & Schankerman,
Patent Quality]; Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property
Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & EcON. 45 (2004) [hereinafter Lanjouw &
Schankerman, Protecting IP]; Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1521 (2005); see also U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING
INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS (2010),
available
at
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/migrated/Patent
Reform-paper.pdf; JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); Joseph Farrell & Robert P.
Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix
Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY
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examiners who issue a high number of patents (average of eighty or more
patents per year) will issue a disproportionately high number of litigated
patents. However, this study argues that this is not the case.
Previous studies have shown that the majority of patents go unenforced,2
and many may be worthless. 3 However, those patents that are valuable have the
ability to demand large royalty rates and keep competitors out of the market.
This Article focuses on the "valuable" patents by using litigated patents as a
proxy for the valuable patent population. Specifically, this Article attempts to
tie examiner characteristics to more objective measures of the performance of
the examination process. These objective measures of performance include
experience level of the examiner, average time it takes the examiner to issue a
patent, and primary signatory authority. This Article then examines judicial
decisions to determine if there are common characteristics between those
examiners who issue patents that are subsequently litigated.
Only around 1.5% of patents are ever litigated in court. 4 However, when
patents do get litigated, the process is expensive, disruptive, and somewhat
inconsistent. In a 2011 study, the American Intellectual Property Law
Association (AIPLA) found that for a claim that is less than $1 million, the
median legal costs are $700,000. 5 When $10 million to $25 million is
considered "at risk," median litigation costs can hit $3.3 million. 6 For a claim
over $25 million, median legal costs are $5.5 million.7 Academics and
practitioners alike have attempted to quantify characteristics for those patents

TECH. L.J. 943 (2004); Paul M. Janicke, On the Causes of Unpredictability of Federal
Circuit Decisions in Patent Cases, 3 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 93-94 (2005); Jay P.
Kesan, David L. Schwartz & Ted Sichelman, Paving the Path to Accurately Predicting
Legal Outcomes: A Comment on Projessor Chien's Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 97 (2012); Gerald Mossinghoff & Donald R. Dunner, Increasing the Certainty in
Patent Litigation: The Need Jor Federal Circuit Approved Pattern Jury Instructions, 83 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 431,432-33 (2001); Lee Petherbridge, On PredictingPatent
Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2012); Shine S. Tu, Unluck/Luck of the Draw: An Empirical
Analysis of Examiner Allowance Rates, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10 (2012). But see Ted
Sichelman, Myths of(Un)certainty at the FederalCircuit, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 118889 (2010).
2. Moore, supra note 1, at 1521-22 (arguing that in 2005 there were approximately
180,000 patents issued per year, in contrast to approximately 4,500 patents enforced against
infringers in patent lawsuits).
3. Id. at 1525-26 (finding that most patentees fail to pay maintenance fees of only a
few thousand dollars). Maintenance fees are due at 3.5 years ($1600), 7.5 years ($3,600) and
11.5 years ($7,400), set in 37 CFR 1.20(e), (f) and (g), respectively. These fees are cut by
50% for small entities and cut by 75% for micro entities. Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK
OFF.
(Mar.
13,
2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/
fee0101 14.htm (under heading "Patent Maintenance Fees").
4. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1507 (2001).
5. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013)
at 1-129.
6. Id. at 1-130.
7. Id. at1 131.
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that are most litigated to better determine those characteristics of patents that
are more frequently litigated. 8
Patent quality is important because a higher quality patent system is likely
to be taken more seriously at the litigation stage. Some commentators argue
that the initial process of patent review is unreliable and thus produces an
inaccurate signal. 9 All parties would prefer only valid patents be asserted;
however, this is impossible. Thus, understanding facts about the patents can
help us determine their validity before litigation is the next best option. While
11
10
others have studied characteristics such as number of claims, references, 15
14
13
family size, 12 assignments, post-issuance events, and forward citations,
this study attempts to measure patent quality by determining if there are any
common characteristics between those examiners who issue litigated patents.
We previously collected and coded for every patent issued in the past
decade (from 2001 to 2011, approximately 1.7 million patents). 16 Additionally,
we determined that there are two distinct populations of examiners who may be
harming the patent system: (1) those examiners who grant patent applications at
a disproportionately high rate, and (2) those examiners who grant patent
applications at a disproportionately low rate. 17 However, this previous study
does not answer the normative question: which population is harming
innovation more?
To address this question, we have collected and analyzed a new dataset
linking patent litigation filings with our previously generated database on
patent examiners. This current dataset comprises patent litigations that
terminated between 2010 and 2011. The dataset includes 12,923 litigations that
corresponded to 15,161 patents matched to 11,748 patent examiners. 18 For each
patent, we identified the primary and/or secondary examiner and collected
historical information regarding that examiner's entire examination history

8. Chien, supra note 1.
9. Doug Licltman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 68 (2007).
10. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Characteristics,supranote 1, at 140-41.
11. Allison, Lemley, Moore & Tnmkey, supra note 1, at 436-37.
12. Katrin Cremers, Determinants of Patent Litigation in Germany 13 (Ctr. for
European Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 04-72, 2004), available at
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dpO472.pdf (reporting that "the average family size of
litigated patents differs significantly from that of unlitigated patents (5.6 and 4.7)").
13. Chien, supra note 1, at 298-99.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Tu, supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. We coded for 12,923 litigations that corresponded to 15,161 patents. However, we
were only able to match 11,748 patents to the examiner database described in Tu, supra note
1. Accordingly, 3,413 patents fell outside of our examiner database. The examiner database
included only those patents that issued between January 1, 2001 and July 15, 2011. Thus,
many of the patents that were not included were issued before the January 1, 2001 date.
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(including art unit, average examination duration, and average number of
patents granted per year). We then detennined if there were patterns between
prior examination experience and patent litigations.
Several scholars have quantified specific characteristics that are common
among litigated and/or valuable patents. 19 Additionally, some scholars have
attempted to link examiner characteristics to litigation outcomes. However,
many of these studies have looked only at the results from litigations that
reached a "final" decision. 21 In contrast, this study includes not only those
patents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), but
also litigation terminated in the district court system. Accordingly, this study is
more inclusive because it reviews all litigation, not just litigation that has
reached a final decision.
This study examines three possible hypotheses: (1) patent examiners who
issue patents at the highest rate (more than eighty patents per year) will issue
more litigated patents than expected; (2) patent examiners who issue at a very
low rate (fewer than ten patents per year) will issue fewer litigated patents than
expected; and (3) patent examiners with the least amount of experience will
issue more litigated patents than expected. The first hypothesis is born from the
intuition that higher-volume examiners who may not be examining patents
closely will issue patents that more frequently end up in litigation. The second
hypothesis is the corollary to the first hypothesis. Specifically, intuition
suggests that examiners who spend more time examining a patent will issue
fewer patents that end up in litigation because the examiner spends more time
on prior art searches and/or drafting well-crafted rejections. Finally, the third
hypothesis comes from the intuition that more experience at the FfO may lead
to less litigation, while less experience may lead to more litigation.
Many of these intuitive hypotheses are wrong. Specifically, this study finds
that: (1) patent examiners who issue the most patents actually issue relatively
fewer litigated patents, (2) patent examiners who issue at a very low rate issue
litigated patents at an expected rate, and (3) primary patent examiners who are
relatively early in their careers issue litigated patents at a disproportionally high
rate. These data suggest that continued scrutiny of primary examiners who
recently obtained full signatory authority might reduce the granting of litigated
patents.
Additionally, because the highest-volume primary examiners grant fewer

19. lain M. Cockburn, Samuel Kortum & Scott Stem, Are All Patent Examiners
Equal? The Impact of Characteristicson Patent Statistics and Litigation Outcomes, in
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 19 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill

eds., 2003); Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey, supra note 1; Allison, Lemley & Walker,
supra note 1; Allison & Lemley, supra note 1; Chien, supra note 1; Lanjouw &
Schankerman, Characteristics, supra note 1; Lanjouw & Schankerman, Patent Quality,
supra note 1; Lanjouw & Schankerman, Protecting 1P, supra note 1; see also Kesan,
Schwartz & Sichelman, supra note 1, at 97; Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 75.
20. Cockburn et al., supra note 19.
21. Id.; Allison & Lemley, supra note 1, at 187.
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than expected litigated patents, it may be efficient to create mechanisms to
generate more high volume primary examiners. One possible way to emulate
these high volume examiners who issue fewer litigated patents is to create a
two-track specialization system for patent examiners. If one group of examiners
specializes in prior-art searching, while another group of examiners specializes
in drafting office actions, this division of labor could mimic the specialization
of one senior examiner in a much shorter timeframe. This may allow the PTO
to emulate the experience of one 10+ year examiner in a much shorter amount
of time. This solution would help not only the backlog of request for continued
examination applications (RCEs), but the general backlog of unexamined
patent applications while increasing patent quality.
Part I of this article briefly summarizes the patent examination process.
Part II summarizes some of the previous empirical literature in the field. Part III
details the dataset, its compilation, and the methodology used to analyze the
data, and then identifies the intrinsic limitations in this dataset. Part IV
interprets and explains the results. Finally, Part V draws some general
conclusions based on the patent litigation data and suggests further avenues for
research.
I. BACKGROUND
It is uncontested that the PTO wields an enormous budget and oversees 22a
large number of employees. The PTO employs some 7,800 patent examiners
and manages a budget of approximately $3 billion dollars. 23 The PTO planned
to hire an additional 3,000 patent examiners in 2012-2013 to help reduce the
backlog from 619,204 unexamined patent applications
to 329,500 by 2015 and
24
achieve a first action pendency of 10.1 months.
A. PatentingProcedure
25

Patent work flow is streamlined and fairly well defined. Applications first
arrive at the central receiving office to determine if all of the procedural
requirements are met to qualify for a filing date. Patent applications are then

22. As of May 2014, there were 8,108 patent examiners. Data Visualization Center,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml
(last visited May 11, 2014). (The PT0 dashboard changes every week but gives the most up
to date information about the PTO statistics.)
23. For fiscal year 2013 the PTO projected fee collections to 2.953 billion, which will
fund the required $2.822 billion in 12,212 full-time equivalent (FTE). U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013, PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 6 (2013), available at
http: //www.uspto. gov /about/ stratplan/budget/ fy l3pbr.pdf.
24. Id.; Data Visualization Center, supra note 22 (listing current backlog as 619,204).
Currently the first action pendency is 18.9 months. DataVisualization Center, supranote 22.
25. See Cockburn et al., supra note 19. For a review of the patent work flow
procedure, see generally Tu, supra note 1, at 10-20.
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sorted into the appropriate "Technology Center" in the Patent Office for
examination. Currently, the Patent Office has seven active technology centers
(grouped by 100s). 2 6 For example, Technology Center 1600 deals with
biotechnology and organic chemistry patent applications. Each technology
center is further divided into "workgroups." Workgroups (grouped by 10s)
further narrow the broad technology center into specific fields. For example,
1640 is a workgroup that deals with immunology, receptor/ligands, cytokines
recombinant hormones, and molecular biology. Finally, each workgroup is
divided into "art units." An art unit (grouped by Is) is a working group that is
responsible for reviewing a cluster of related patent art. For example, Art Unit
1648 deals with viral immunology.
Each art unit is staffed by one supervisory patent examiner (SPE) and a
number of patent examiners. Once the patent application is assigned to an art
27
unit, the SPE assigns the application to a specific working examiner. 28
Assignment to the working examiner, for the most part, is done randomly.
The working examiner will usually have responsibility for examination of the
application until it is (1) allowed, (2) rejected, or (3) abandoned.
Patent examiners are given great discretion to reject claims based on the
legal formalities and requirements. For simplicity, this study groups rejections
based on issues: (1) internal to the application and (2) external to the
application (prior art type rejections). Internal issues are flaws within the four
corners of the application. Examples of internal issues include enablement,
written description, indefiniteness, and best mode type rejections. External
issues are usually third-party references (patent or non-patent
literature) that
29
render the application non-novel or obvious over the prior art.
There are requirements that are internal to the application. Typically, these
include written description, enablement, definiteness, and/or utility type
rejections.
To overcome the written description bar, an applicant must
describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can
reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed

26. See generally Patent Technology Centers, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb. 17,
2010, 12:34 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/about/contacts/phone directory/pat tech (defining
the structure of the PTO technology centers).
27. This assignment is usually done in a random fashion. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven
Sampat, Examiner Characteristicsand Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REv. EcON. & STAT. 817,
822 (2012) (finding that "[w]ithin subclasses, SPEs for the most part assigned applications
randomly, assigning applications to particular examiners on the basis of the last digit of the
application serial number').
28. Some SPEs will assign applications on the basis of the last digit of the application
serial number. Other SPEs will assign based on docket management, giving the oldest
unassigned application to the examiner who has finished examining a prior application. Id.
29. Prior art is defined generally as references such as a patent, printed publication,
public use, on sale or something otherwise available to the public before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2011).
30. See §§ 112(a), 112(a), 112(b), and 101 respectively.
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invention.31 Second, the specification must enable the invention. 32 Specifically,
the specification must describe how to make and how to use the invention.
Third, the application claims must meet a threshold level of clarity and
precision. The claims should define the patentable subject matter with a
reasonable degree of particularity and distinctness in light of the specification,
prior art, and knowledge of the person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made. 33 Finally, the claimed invention must be useful.
Specifically, an applicant
must identify a specific, substantial, and credible
34
utility for the invention.
Additionally, there are requirements that affect patentability that are
outside the four corners of the patent application. These issues are typically
based on "prior art." In general, prior art references disclose the claimed
invention (or parts of the claimed invention) prior to a critical date. 35 An
examiner then searches multiple databases for both patent and non-patent
references to determine if any references anticipate or render the claimed
invention obvious. 3 6 Typically, searches for prior art include prior U.S. patents
and patent applications in relevant technology classes and subclasses, foreign
patent documents, scientific and technical journals, and/or other databases and
indexes. Efficient and effective keyword searches of these databases require
significant technical knowledge and time.
After reviewing the application specification, claims, and prior art the
examiner then issues a "first action" letter to the applicant. The examiner has
two choices: (1) allow all or some of the claims in application, and/or (2) reject
all or some of the claims, based typically on the aforementioned rejections. The
applicant then has no more than six months to respond by amending the claims
and/or arguing against the examiner's rejections. After reviewing the
applicant's response, the examiner can then (1) allow some or all of the claims
in the application if the arguments/amendments traverse the rejection, and/or
(2) maintain some or all of the initial rejections, and/or (3) issue new grounds
for rejections based on the amendments/arguments made by the applicant. If the
examiner rejects claims for a second time, the examiner typically responds in a
"final" office action. The applicant can then respond to a final office action by

31. § 112(a); see also Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1991); MPEP § 2163 (9th ed. Mar. 2014), available at http://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/
manual /MPEP/e8r9/d0e 18.xml.
32. § 112(a); see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en banc); Vas -Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563; MPEP, supra note 31, § 2164.
33. § 112(b); see also MPEP, supra note 31, § 2173.02.
34. § 101; see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MPEP, supra
note 31, § 2107.01.
35. See MPEP, supra note 31, § 901 (describing what qualifies as prior art); see also §
102. The author notes that the critical date for prior art will change slightly based on passage
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified at scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). However, that discussion is beyond the scope of
this Article.
36. See §§ 102-103; see also MPEP, supra note 31, §§ 2131, 2164.
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(1) filing a request for continued examination (RCE), which effectively allows
the applicant one more round of review/responses with the examiner; (2) filing
a continuation or a continuation in part application; (3) appealing the
examiner's decision; or (4) abandoning the application (simply by either not
responding within the six-month time period or expressly abandoning the
application via a letter to the FfO).
B. PatentExaminers
Patent examiners vary in many respects. The most important differences
among examiners are (1) experience at the PTO, (2) technical backgrounds, (3)
art units, (4) workload and production goals, and (5) supervision and review.
Experience at the PTO varies dramatically. Primary examiners are usually
more senior examiners with at least five years of experience, and usually have
partial or full signatory authority. 37 Junior examiners are usually classified as
"secondary examiners." Secondary examiners usually have less than five years
of experience and do not have signatory authority. Each secondary examiner is
paired with a primary examiner who directly supervises and edits the work
product generated by the secondary examiner. Over time, the secondary
examiner takes greater control over his docket and may graduate to a primary
examiner with "partial" signatory authority.
Technical backgrounds between examiners also vary radically. Certain art
units may require an advanced degree or more specialized training. For
example, because of the technical nature required to examine applications
dealing with antibody engineering and cancer immunology many examiners in
Art Unit 1642 (biotechnology applications) have Ph.D.'s. In contrast,
examiners in Art Unit 3636, which deals with chairs and seats, may not require
an advanced degree to understand the technology.
Variations in art unit practices also greatly affect examiner behavior. Some
art units promote specialization by individual examiners. For example, in
mechanical art units, a small group of examiners may be responsible for all
patent applications within a specific class or subclass. Accordingly, in these art
units, there is less supervision and fewer checks and balances on the examiner.
In contrast, some art units rely on group organization. In these art units there is
less technical specialization but an increased amount of group discussion,
knowledge sharing, and collective thought between examiners. Accordingly,
there are greater opportunities for monitoring and supervision as well as greater
38
knowledge transfer between examiners.
Workload and production goals are one of the most significant differences
among examiners, even within the same art unit. Examiners are allotted fixed

37. In general, signatory authority allows an examiner to respond to the applicant
without further review. An allowance, however, still could be verified through quality
control (QC) regardless of whether the allowance was by a secondary or primary examiner.
38. Cockburn, et al., supra note 19.
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amounts of time to initially examine an application and for disposal of the
application. As an examiner becomes promoted, the amount of time allotted for
examining an individual application is reduced. Regardless of technology
center, the 100% benchmark is at the General Schedule (GS) GS-12 pay
scale. 3 9 For example, a junior examiner who is a GS-10 (two levels under GS12) may have to reach only 85% of the disposals required by a similar examiner
in the same art unit who is a GS-12. Similarly, a senior examiner who is a GS14 (two levels over GS-12) may have to reach 110% of the disposals required
by a similarly situated GS-12 in the same art unit. Accordingly, primary
examiners may have significantly less time to review an application compared
to a secondary examiner. This shorted time period may play an important role,
especially for a detailed search for prior art. Differences in these time
allocations and percentages vary across 40technology centers, but are always
relative to the GS-12 level in that art unit.
Oversight and review is another significant difference among examiners.
Examiners can be sorted into four groups: (1) secondary examiners with no
signatory authority, (2) secondary examiners with partial signatory authority,
(3) primary examiners with temporary full signatory authority, and (4) primary
examiners with full signatory authority. Secondary examiners, by definition,
have no signatory authority, which means that all substantive office actions are
reviewed by their supervisor before going out to the applicant. Secondary
examiners with partial signatory authority can sign off most office actions
without supervision, but are specifically reviewed by a primary examiner when
they issue a final office action or an allowance. 4 1 Primary examiners with
temporary full signatory authority can sign off on all actions, 42 but are
scrutinized for at least approximately six months (thirteen consecutive pay
periods). 43 Finally, primary examiners with full signatory authority can sign off
on all actions without supervision.
An examiner must complete the Signatory Authority Review Program to
achieve the position of primary examiner. The examiner's work is evaluated
during two separate periods (partial signatory authority period and full

39. Telephone Interview with Senior Patent Examiner, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (June 2013). The GS salaries and wages scale are determined by the U.S Office of
Personnel Management.
40. Ron D. Katnelson, My 2010 Wishes for the U.S. Patent Examiner 5 (Jan. 8, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (suggesting that the average production goal is set at 19.5 GS-12
equivalent hours, based on the 1976
PTO annual report),
available at
http://works.bepress.com/rkatznelson/60; see also id. at 8 fig.5 (showing PTO examination
hours per patent production unit by technology workgroup).
41. See MPEP, supra note 31, § 1005 (listing actions which cannot be delegated to an
examiner with partial signatory authority, thus requiring the signature of a primary
examiner).
42. See id. § 1004 (listing actions which require the attention of a primary examiner.).
43. Letter to All Patent Examiners from Edward E. Kubasiewicz, Assistant
Commissioner for Patents, regarding the Signatory Authority Program (Dec. 1, 1992) (on
file with author).
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signatory authority period) to determine if the examiner is qualified to
pennanently represent the Director and sign all actions independently. The
length of each trial period is at least thirteen consecutive pay periods
(approximately six months), but can go longer. Additionally, for each step, the
examiner must perforn at least 700 hours of actual examination time. Upon
completion of the first review period, the examiner can progress from GS-13 to
GS-13 Partial Signatory Authority (PSA). Subsequently, when the second
review period is completed, the examiner can move from GS-13 PSA to GS-14
Full Signatory Authority (FSA) if the examiner performs44 at the "fully
successful" level in the PSA for at least ten consecutive weeks.
Interestingly, U.S. patent examiners seem to issue patents at the same rate
as their European and Japanese counterparts. According to the PTO, during
2010 and 2011 the percentage of patents granted was approximately 44%. 4 In
the European Patent Office (EPO), the percentages of patents granted in 2010
and 2011 were 38% and 43%, respectively. The Japanese Patent office (JPO)
grant rates during the 2010 and 2011 years were 64% and 76%, respectively.
Therefore, US patent examiners issue patents at a rate comparable to their EPO
and JPO counterparts, even though US examiners examine more than twice the
number of claims, 4 6 while receiving a compensation package that is only about
58% of EPO examiners and less than 50% of JPO examiners. 47 Unsurprisingly,
the annual staff turnover rate at the PTO was about 30% in 2008.48 In contrast,
the turnover rate at the EPO was between 3-5%, and the turnover rate at the

JPO was 0-3%.49

44. Design examiners undergo a slightly different review process. They start the
partial signatory authority program six months after receiving their promotion to GS-12.
Examiners must be at 95% fully successful for the eleven weeks prior to starting the
program. The PSA program lasts thirteen consecutive bi-weeks, each of which is fourteen
days long, and requires that the PSA candidate finish the program at fully successful and
with no less than 700 examining hours during the trial period. The FSA program for design
examiners begins automatically after thirty-five consecutive pay periods after promotion to
GS-13, as long as the examiner is performing at the fully successful level or higher. The FSA
lasts thirteen consecutive pay periods, and must include 700 examining hours. Successful
completion of the FSA grants the examiner full signatory authority and promotion to GS-14.
Telephone Interview with Senior Patent Examiner, supra note 39; see also Letter from
Edward E. Kubasiewicz, Assistant Commissioner For Patents to All Patent Examiners (Dec.
1, 1992) (explaining the process for promotion to full signatory authority).
45. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2013, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. (Mar. 26, 2014), http: //www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ ac/ido/oeip/taf/us stat.htm.
46. Pierre Picard & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Patent Office Governance
and Patent System Quality 8 tbl.1 (Ctr. for Research & Econ. Analysis, Discussion Paper
2011-06, 2011).
47. Id. at 12 tbl.4.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id. at 13-14 & tbl.5 (showing that job satisfaction could be tied to different
compensation packages, types governance structures, tenured contracts, unionization rates,
and severance clauses).
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II.

EXISTING LITERATURE

Intellectual property rights have become a crucial part of our nation's
economy. However, as noted above, many patents fail to attain economic
success. Accordingly, many scholars have attempted to quantify those
50
characteristics that are common among litigated and/or valuable patents.
However, many scholars come to the conclusion that patent litigation is
uncertain and unpredictable.5 1 As noted above, it is uncontested that the FfO
wields an enormous budget and oversees a large number of employees.
However, the unanswered question is whether the PTO is issuing good patents
or not.
Many scholars have attempted to find common characteristics between
litigated patents. However, only a few focus on the examiners who issue
litigated patents,5 2 and those rare studies focus mainly on the patents that have
been litigated to a CAFC-issued final decision. In contrast, this study focuses
on examiners who issue litigated patents from all district courts and segments
the examiners by experience at the FfO as well as volume of patents issued.
Below is a summary of some of the literature dealing with examiner
characteristics and litigation outcomes, as well as some of the literature that
details those characteristics in common with "valuable" patents.
Cockburn, Kortum, and Stem previously linked examiner characteristics to
litigation outcomes. 5 3 This study was based on 182 patents from the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit between 1997 and 2000. Cockburn et al. found
that some examiners have a higher litigation rate at the CAFC than other
examiners. Specifically, they discovered that there is substantial variation in
examiner experience, tenure, and the degree of forward citations (i.e.
referenced more often by subsequent patents). 4 Additionally, they explained
that examiner experience and workload do not affect the probability that the
CAFC will find a patent invalid. Finally, they found that patents which are
frequently cited have an increased probability of being found invalid by the
CAFC.
Allison, Lemley, Moore and Trunkey (ALMT) examined characteristics of
valuable patents by reviewing characteristics of patents litigated between 1999
and 2000 (6,861 patents).5 5 In sum, ALMT found that valuable patents (1) are
litigated soon after obtained, (2) are owned by domestic companies, (3) are
issued to individuals or small companies, (4) cite to more prior art, (5) are

50. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 1; Allison & Lemley, supra note 1; Allison, Lemley &
Walker, supra note 1.
51. See, e.g., Janicke, supra note 1, at 93-94; Mossinghoff & Dunner, supra note 1, at
432-33. For a competing opinion, see Sichelman, supra note 1, at 1188-89.
52. Cockburn et al., supra note 19.
53. Id.
54. Id.at 28-30.
55. Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey, supra note 1, at 437.
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referenced more often by subsequent patents ("forward citations"), (6) include
more claims, and (7) are disproportionately represented from certain
industries. 56 Furthennore, in a follow-up study, Allison, Lemley and Walker
(ALW) found that the "most-litigated" patents also have interesting
characteristics. In sum, ALW found that the most litigated patents (1) had more
patent continuations, (2) are cited more than twice as often, 57 (3) include more
than 50% more claims, 58 (4) cite to more prior art (including nearly three times
as many U.S. and foreign patents, and almost ten times as many non-patent
prior art references), 59 (5) are cited more than twice as often by subsequent
patents, (6) are disproportionately represented from certain
industries, 6 1 and
62
entities.
non-practicing
(7) are more likely to be owned by
The Allison and Lemely (AL) study6 3 reviewed 299 patents litigated in 239
different cases between 1989 and 1996 resulting in a final decision and a
written opinion.64 Of the patents reviewed, 54% (162 patents) were found
valid, while 46% (138 patents) were found invalid.65 AL further segmented the
invalid patents and found that of the 138 patents that were found invalid, 26.8%
were held invalid by § 102 prior art, 31% were held invalid by § 102 non-prior
art, and 42% were held invalid by § 103 obviousness. 6 6 Juries held valid more
than two-thirds of the patents tried before them. 67 In contrast, only one quarter
68
of the cases decided on pre-trial motion were decided in favor of the patentee.
Interestingly, the AL study found that the majority of patents litigated came
from "run-of-the-mill mechanical inventions" and not chemical or electrical
inventions. 69 Additionally, the AL study found that even though approximately
42-48% of the patents issued in 1995 were of foreign origin, only 14% of the
litigated patents were of foreign ownership. 70 Uncited prior art is more likely to

56. Id.at 438.
57. Allison, Lemley, & Walker, supra note 1, at 14.
58. Id. at 15 (finding that the most-litigated patents contain 39.3 claims on average
compared to 24.5 claims for once-litigated patents).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 14.
61. Id. at 18 (showing that the most-litigated patents are mostly software patents); see
also Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey, supra note 1, at 438.
62. Allison, Lemley, & Walker, supra note 1, at 26; see also Michael Risch, Patent
Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. (2012) (arguing that patents enforced by non-practicing
entities are similar to many other litigated patents).
63. I note that the AL study covers many other issues that I do not review in this
summary. I have only summarized those issues germane to this paper. A complete summary
of their findings can be found at Allison & Lemley, supra note 1, at 251-52.
64. Id. at 194.
65. Id. at 205.
66. Id.at 208.
67.

Id. at 212.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 217.
70. Id.at 226.
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invalidate a patent than previously cited art.7 1 Finally, patent litigation involved
72
patents that were fairly old and patented for several years before enforcement.
Lanjouw and Schankerman also published several studies linking
infonnation on patent suits from the U.S. court system to the detailed
infonnation about inventions and their owners. 73 Lanjouw coded for
characteristics such as number of claims, IPC assignments, citations, ownership
(nationality and type of ownership: corporate or individual), and case types
(patent owner as plaintiff or defendant). 74 Generally, the authors found that
there is an increased probability of patent litigation if the patent is core to a set
of follow-on innovations for a corporation (as opposed to an individual).
Additionally, the authors found that litigated patents are much more frequently
cited 75 and have far more claims 76 than the control group.
Colleen Chien also published a study analyzing some of the characteristics
of litigated patents versus non-litigated patents. 77 In this study, Chien generates
a model for predicting the patents that are most likely to be litigated based on a
combination of intrinsic and acquired patent file characteristics. Intrinsic traits
include characteristics such as number of claims, issuance to small entity or
large entity, number of foreign counterparts, number of family members, 78 and
time spent in prosecution. 7 9 Acquired traits include characteristics such as
ownership (including whether the patent has been subsequently
assigned/transferred and changes in owner size80 ), investment (including
maintenance fee payment, reexamination, and/or reissue), collateralized
(security interest in the patent), financing, forward citations, and enforcement
(including licensing and/or litigation). 81 Focusing on acquired traits, Chien's
study found that litigated patents are more likely to (1) be transferred, (2)
experience a change in owner size, (3) undergo ex parte reexamination, (4)
have maintenance fees paid, (5) be collateralized, and (6) be cited. 82

71.

Id. at 233.

72.

Id. at 237.

73. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Characteristics, supra note 1; Lanjouw &
Schankerman, Patent Quality, supra note 1; Lanjouw & Schankerman, Protecting IP, supra
note 1.
74. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Characteristics,supranote 1, at 133-34.
75. Id. at 137.
76.

Id. at 141.

77. Chien, supra note 1; see also Kesan,. Schwartz & Sichelman, supra note 1;
Petherbridge, supra note 1.
78. Chien, supra note 1, at 299. (Professor Chien also analyzed "ancestor" patents from
which the patent claimed priority and "descendant" patents that claimed the benefit of
priority.)
79.

Id. at 298-99.

80. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2013) (defining small entity status, as well as change in
owner size from small entity to large entity or vice versa).
81. Chien, supra note 1, at 299-301.
82. Id. at 317.
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III.

DESCRIPTION OF STUDY

This study examines the "overall population" (OP) of litigated patents. The
dataset includes all patents that were litigated in 2010 and 2011 that we could
key to their corresponding patent examiner. The dataset is not segmented by
those patents held invalid or valid, or infringed or non-infringed. It is also
important to note that this study analyzes the incidence and characteristics of
case filings. Because the vast majority of patent cases do not reach final
judgment, we focus on all patent case filings in this study.
Additionally, the datasets are defined in terms of patents, not cases. Many
cases reviewed had more than one patent in question. Accordingly,
we review
83
each of those patents as an independent unit for analysis.
A. Overall Population (OP) Dataset
This study coded for every litigation that "terminated" in 2010 to 2011.
Thus, any case that ended in either district court or the Federal Circuit was
coded. The dataset includes 12,923 litigations that corresponded to 15,161
patents matched to 11,748 patent examiners. 84 This Article focuses only on
validity decisions based on United States issued patents. Because we focus on
issued patents, the dataset does not include appeals from the rejection of a
patent application by the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI).85 Additionally, we do not include decisions of foreign courts or
decisions or appeals from the United States International Trade Commission
(ITC). Finally, it is important to note that this data set is a highly selective
sample, and not representative of the majority of patents granted.
This dataset significantly differs from that described in Cockburn et al.
because Cockburn et al. included only "CAFC-tested" patents that reached a
final appellate decision. 86 In contrast, this dataset includes not only those
patents appealed to the Federal Circuit, but also those patents whose litigation

83. When necessary, this analysis was bifurcated even further by independent claims
in each patent. For example, if in one patent, a set of claims were held valid while another
set of claims were held invalid, we broke this down into two different patents for purposes of
our analysis.
84. See supra note 18. Accordingly, 3,413 patents fell outside of our examiner
database. The examiner database included only those patents that issued between January 1,
2001 and July 15, 2011. Thus, many of the patents that were not included were issued before
January 1, 2001.
85. BPAI appeals were not included because the standard of review for appeals from
the BPAI introduces data that are not completely comparable with the data derived from
infringement actions in the district courts or the Federal Circuit. For example, the burdens of
proof and the nature of the parties are dissimilar. Additionally, as noted by Allison et al.,
other problems include (1) the ex parte nature of the BPAI proceedings, (2) the absence of
juries, and (3) the absence of the presumption of validity. See Allison & Lemley, supra note
1, at 195 n.23.
86. Cockburn et al., supra note 19.
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terminated in the district court system. However, Cockburn et al. were able to
link overall examiner experiences (in terns of years as well as total number of
issued patents) with the litigated patents. In contrast, this study is limited
to
87
examiner information gleaned from the last ten years of issued patents.
One might argue that a more accurate determination may be to use the
average number of patents issued by a specific examiner during the year the
litigated patent was issued. However, the average number of patents issued per
year gives a more accurate view of the examiner's allowance profile because it
is not a snapshot, but a moving average of the examiner's allowance rate over
the examiner's career at the PTO between 2001 and 2012.
B. Examiner Dataset
In a previous study, we created a database of every patent issued between
2001 and 2012.88 The collection, limitations, and interpretation of this database
have also previously been described. 89 Briefly, we coded for every patent
issued between January 2001 and June 2012 (approximately 1.7 million
patents). Each patent was matched with a specific "working" examiner. 90 An
average number of patents issued per year could be calculated for each
examiner by simply summing the "number of patents issued" 9 1 divided by the
"years of service" as an examiner. 92 The examiner database includes only
utility patents and is unfiltered for continuations, CIPs, divisional applications,
and applications directed at foreign filings. Plant, design, reexamination and
reissue patents are not included in this dataset.
Each patent that was litigated in the OP database was matched with the
examiner database that was previously created. Accordingly, the OP database
contains a profile of examiners who issued patents that later underwent
litigation.

87. Our examiner dataset includes only data starting from January 2001, which is the
earliest timeframe for which electronic records regarding specific examiners were kept.
88. Tu, supra note 1.

89. See id.
at 54-63.
90. The "working examiner" is the examiner who did the most direct work on that
application: the secondary examiner (if present) or the primary examiner if there was no
secondary examiner.
91. The "number of patents" issued includes all patents issued by the specific
examiner between January 2001 and July 2012.
92. The "years of service" does not include those years where the examiner issues only
one patent. This was done to remove examiners that could fall within these categories: (1)
those examiners who were only briefly at the PTO, but left before issuing more than one
patent, (2) those examiners who are primary examiners who mainly review the work of
secondary examiners but issued one patent by themselves, (3) those examiners who have
issued one patent, but have not issued any since, (4) those examiners hired at the end of the
year, who may have issued only one patent due to the ramp up time, and (5) examiners who
came back to the PTO and needed time to ramp up during their return year.
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C. Data Collected
For each patent in the OP dataset, we collected the following data points, to
the extent that it could be detennined from the court's opinion:
case name and citation;
patent number and art unit;
secondary and/or primary examiner's name;
years of examination experience;
average time it takes the specific examiner to issue a patent;
title of examiner 93 at the time the patent issued;
filing date of patent; and
issue date of the patent.
D. Hypothesis to Be Tested
The OP database was used to determine which examiners were issuing
litigated patents. We first wanted to determine if there was a correlation
between examiner allowance rates and frequency of litigation. Several
hypotheses were tested using this database:
Hypothesis 1: Patent examiners who issue patents at the highest rate (those
patent examiners who issue more than eighty patents per year) will issue more
patents that end up in litigation.
The hypothesis is that these high-volume examiners will end up in
litigation more often because they are "rubber stamping" patents, 94 and thus are
not completing a thorough review of the prior art or specification, and are
granting broader claims.
Hypothesis 2: Patent examiners who issue at a very low rate (those patent
examiners who issue less than ten patents per year) will issue relatively fewer
patents that end up in litigation.
The hypothesis in this case is that these examiners will end up in litigation
at a lower rate because they are able to spend more time reviewing and finding
prior art as well as completing a thorough analysis of the specification.
Hypothesis 3: Patent examiners who have the least experience will have
more litigated patents than those examiners with four or more years of
experience.
Similar to Hypothesis 2, we segment the data based not on allowance rates,
but on years of experience at the PTO to determine if there is a higher rate of

93. The title of the examiner could fall into one of three categories: (1) Primary, (2)
Secondary, or (3) Both. The "Both" category simply means that the year that the patent
issued, the examiner was a primary on some patents and a secondary examiner on other
patents.
94. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
EMORY L.J. 181 (2008).
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litigation for those examiners early in their career versus later in their career.
E. Limitations
The OP database is a broad database but suffers from some selection bias
due to the examiner-matching step. Specifically, temporal selection bias occurs
in the OP database since the examiner database contains only those patents that
were issued between 2001 and 2012. Accordingly, litigations dealing with
"older patents" (i.e., those patents issued before 2001) are not included in the
OP database.
There are also many inherent limitations with using a litigation-based
database. For example, litigated patents may inherently represent a
subpopulation of patents with unique characteristics. 9 5 Additionally, there are
many variables associated with litigation in general; for example, the
experience and skill of the lawyers, differing jury pools, the experience of the
judges (experience with both patent cases and the specific technology in
question), witnesses, and resources available to both parties. 9 6 Accordingly, it
is important to note that this subpopulation of patents is not representative of
most patents that are issued.
Finally, there are many reasons to bring litigation, but many of these
reasons may not represent errors by the patent examiner. For example, a patent
could be litigated and found invalid because of inequitable conduct. In this
situation, the patent examiner may have issued a valid patent based on the
fraudulent information given to her by the applicant. Another example deals
with a patent that was found valid, but non-infringed. Here, the litigated patent
may have been correctly issued, but litigated due to incorrect interpretation of
the scope of the claims. Accordingly, simply because a patent is litigated, does
not mean that there were errors made at the patent office.
To address these issues, we are currently working on a study that reviews
only those patents that have been litigated to final judgment and found invalid.
We then connect these invalidated patents to their corresponding examiners to
determine if there are any common characteristics among the examiners who
issue invalidated patents. However, we note that the pool of litigations that are
litigated to final judgment dramatically reduces the sample size.
IV

RESULTS

A. StatisticalAnalysis
To determine whether the actual count of litigations was significantly
different than the weighted average, we calculated the 95% confidence

95. Allison & Lemley, supra note 1, at 203; Chien, supra note 1, at 283.
96. Allison & Lemley, supra note 1, at 204.
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intervals for both actual and weighted average distributions. Each confidence
interval is centered around the actual count and the weighted average count for
each observed data point and is visually represented by a vertical line
designating the range of the interval. When the confidence interval of the actual
observation overlaps with the confidence interval of the expected count, no
significant difference between the two is detected. However, when the two
confidence intervals are not overlapping at a particular data point, the
difference between the two confidence intervals is significant at that specific
data point (p < 0.05).
The examined data is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution because (a)
Poisson is a model for counting successes (number of litigations) and (b) the
observation of successes (number of litigations) in each interval is
independent.97 The mean of every Poisson distribution is usually utilized to
calculate confidence intervals. However, when the mean is unknown, the actual
count value (X) in each observational point (in this case number of litigations)
can be used as an estimate. As a result, the following formula was utilized
where z =1.96 corresponds to a 95% confidence interval:
X+

Za/ 2I"f

In its nature, the Poisson distribution is non-normal, 98 being skewed
limited by zero on the left because count data cannot be negative and
approaching infinity on the right. 99 However, the Poisson distribution
approximates the normal distribution when X is large, 1° ° as it is in this case.
The Poisson distribution is the most common and frequently utilized model for
analyzing count data relative to the number of occurrences of a specific
phenomenon.101
B. General
As a preliminary matter, we examined the frequency of litigation between
technology centers. Because we did not need to match patent examiners to
answer this question, we used the full database, which includes all litigations
from 2010 and 2011. As shown in Figure 1, the most litigated patents come
from technology center 2600 (Communications). The art units are coded as

97.

A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA

(2d ed. 2013).
98.

DEREK BISSELL, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SPC AND TQM (1994).

99. GERRY P. QUINN & MICHAEL J. KEOUGH, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA
ANALYSIS FOR BIOLOGISTS 11 (2002).
100. ANWER KHURSHID & 1JARDEO SAHAI, STATISTICS IN EPIDEMIOLOGY: METHODS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS (1996).

101. Manad Khamkong, Approximate Confidence Interval for the Mean of Poisson
Distribution,2 OPEN J. STAT. 204 (2012).
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follows102:

102. Patent Technology Centers, supra note 26.
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U

Technology Center
Technology Center 1600
Technology Center 1700
Technology Center 2100
Technology Center 2400
Technology Center 2600
Technology Center 2800
Technology Center 2900
Technology Center 3600

Technology Center 3700

Technology Type
Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Chemical and Materials Engineering
Computer Architecture, Software, and Information
Security
Computer Networks, Mutliplex communication,
Video Distribution and Security
Communications
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems
and Components
Designs
Transportation,
Construction,
Electronic
Commerce, Agriculture, National Security and
License & Review
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products

Note that Technology Center 2700 was subdivided into Technology
Centers 2100 and 2600 to accommodate growth in computer-related
applications. 103
Figure]
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103. Wynn Coggins, Technology Center 2700 Splits to Accommodate Growth in
Computer-Related Applications, USPTO TODAY, Nov. 2000, at 12, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/ptotoday/ptotodayl 1.pdf.
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Previously Allison, Lemley, and Walker predicted that the most litigated
patents are "more likely to be software and telecommunications patents, not
mechanical or other types of patents."0 4 This study confirms their finding.
However, we also find that a significant number of litigated patents come from
Technology Center 1600 (Biochemistry and Organic Chemistry). We note that
our dataset is based solely on the art unit. In contrast, the data in Allison,
Lemley and Walker were categorized by hand into an industry and technology
group. 105
Figure 2 shows the type of examiners (primary or secondary examiners)
that are issuing patents that later get litigated. These data required us to match
litigations to specific examiners. Accordingly, we reviewed 15,161 litigated
patents and matched them to 8,274 primary examiners, 2,349 secondary
examiners and 1,125 examiners who were both primary and secondary
examiners at the time the patent was issued. Primary examiners are issuing
litigated patents at a much higher frequency than secondary examiners, with
primary examiners issuing approximately 70% of the litigated patents, while
secondary examiners issue approximately 20% of the litigated patents. This
result is somewhat unsurprising because primary examiners are issuing many
more patents than secondary examiners. We later control for this factor as
shown in Figures 4 and 5. Finally, as shown in Figure 2, approximately 10% of
the litigated patents are issued by examiners who were "both" primary and
secondary examiners. This smaller population "both" represents the fact that
some examiners were transitioning from secondary to primary status and were
issuing patents as both a secondary and primary. Accordingly, the "both"
category includes examiners who were most likely promoted from a secondary
examiner to a primary examiner during the year the litigated patent issued.

104. Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 1, at 3.
105. Id. at 6; see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An
Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution,53 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2114 (2000) (arguing
that the PTO classification system is flawed).
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C. The Overall Population(OP) Database
Hypothesis I Results: Surprisingly, we found that those examiners who
issue at the highest rate (on average more than eighty patents per year), end up
in litigation less than expected. Hypothesis 2 Results: Primary examiners who
issue patents at a lower rate (fewer than ten patents per year), actually
experience a slightly higher than expected litigation rate. Interestingly, primary
examiners who issue between 45-60 patents issue a disproportionately high
number of litigated patents. Hypothesis 3 Results: Finally, when we segment
the primary examiners by years of experience, the primary examiners who issue
a disproportionate number of litigated patents are those with three to six years
of experience. In contrast, when we segment the secondary examiners by years
of experience, all secondary examiners issue litigated patents in an
approximately expected fashion.
Figure 3 graphically depicts the overall results from examiners in all art
units. The solid line depicts the actual litigation from 11,748 patents. The x-axis
represents examiners with a specific average allowance rate. The y-axis
represents the number of patents that have ended up in litigation. The areas
depicted with a star (*) demonstrate that the difference between the expected
litigation rate and the actual litigation rate was significant with a 95%
confidence interval. For example, there are approximately 1,000 patents that
have ended up in litigation that were issued by examiners with an average
allowance rate of between 50 and 55 patents per year. The dotted line
represents the expected litigation rate if all litigations were random.
Specifically, the dotted line represents the total litigations multiplied by the
percentageof patents issued by the specific population of examiners.
For example, those examiners who issue an average of 50-55 patents per
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year issued approximately 6.24% of the total number of patents issued between
2001 and 2012. Accordingly, if litigation was simply random, they should
represent 6.24% multiplied by the total number of litigations (which is
represented by the dotted line). Thus, when the dotted line is below the solid
line, examiners are issuing litigated patents at a higher than expected rate.
Conversely, when the dotted line is above the solid line, examiners are issuing
litigated patents at a lower than expected rate.
Figure 3
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As shown in Figure 3, examiners can be divided into three distinct
populations. The first population includes those examiners who issue patents at
a high rate (on average greater than 80 patents per year). This first population is
issuing fewer than expected litigated patents. The second population includes
those examiners who issue patents at a lower rate (on average 35 patents or less
per year). This second population is issuing litigated patents at approximately
the expected rate. Finally, the third population includes those examiners who
issue patents at a rate of between 40-65 patents per year. This third population
of examiners is issuing litigated patents at a higher than expected rate.
The results from the first population (examiners issuing on average greater
than 80 patents per year) are expanded in Figure 3A. The results from the first
population are surprising because one might expect that the highest volume
examiners (those examiners who might be "rubber stamping" patents) may not
be reviewing patents as closely or searching the prior art as carefully as other
examiners who spend more time on each application with less patent issuance
per year. However, these highest volume examiners are actually doing much
better than expected. Specifically, these examiners issue a lower than expected
number of litigated patents. One possible explanation for this phenomenon may
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be that these are the most experienced examiners, and thus they are very
familiar with the prior art, and can quickly administer the correct rejections
while allowing cases. Alternatively, it could be that these examiners can
determine which patent applications are commercially valuable, and are able to
filter out and allow only those patent applications that are not likely to be
litigated.
Figure3A
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The results from the second population (examiners issuing on average less
than 35 patents per year) are expanded in Figure 3B. The second population is
issuing litigated patents at a rate statistically proportional to the number of
patents issued by this population. In general, these examiners are spending
more time to issue a lower volume of patents. 1 06 These results might be
unexpected; because these examiners are issuing at a lower rate, one might
expect that these examiners are conducting more comprehensive reviews of

106. Tu, supra note 16, at 17, fig. 3.
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patent applications. However, one explanation is that these examiners consist
largely of secondary examiners, who are still inexperienced, and thereby more
careful because they are reviewed not only by quality control examiners, but by
their supervising examiners.
Figure3B
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The results from the third population (those examiners who issue on
average between 40-65 patents per year) are expanded in Figure 3C.
Interestingly, the results from the third population may also be explained by
level of experience. We may see a higher litigation rate for these examiners
because they have
and are working independently for
.... full signatory authority107
the first time, but may still need guidance.
Compounding the problem, these
primary examiners with full signatory authority have a corresponding decrease
in available examination time and increase in production rates. Thus, to
compensate, these examiners may be allowing cases from their docket that they
would not have issued given a lower production rate. This effect is more
pronounced when we segment the data by years of service as a primary
examiner. "'

107. See also infra Part IV.E (segmenting examiners by years of service).
108. Id.
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Figure 3C
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D. Segmentation by Primary Versus Secondary Examiners
We segmented these overall results into two categories: (1) primary
examiners and (2) secondary examiners. Accordingly, Figures 4 and 5 depict
litigated patents by primary and secondary examiners, respectively, who issue
litigated patents at specific rates.
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 4, primary examiners who issue patents at
a rate lower than 40 patents per year are issuing litigated patents at a higher rate
than expected. Additionally, primary examiners who issue more than 80 patents
per year are issuing litigated patents at a lower rate than expected.
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One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the examiners who
issue patents at the highest rate are the examiners with the most experience.
Thus, these high rate examiners know how to quickly and correctly reject or
grant patents based on their knowledge of the prior art and patentability
standards. These high volume examiners may represent the best of both worlds,
that is, granting valid patents and reducing the backlog of applications, all
while avoiding costly litigation.
Another possible explanation for this phenomenon is that high volume
examiners are not simulating innovation, but simply know how to filter out
commercially valuable patents to avoid issuing litigated patents. Thus, it is
possible that these examiners are simply better able to select out those patent
applications that may be litigated or broad enough to encompass competitors'
commercial embodiments. This type of selection bias is difficult to control.
Specifically, without examining each individual patent and comparing each
patent against control patents (those issued by lower volume examiners), it is
impossible to determine if this selection bias is occurring.
As shown in Figure 5, we segment the data to assess secondary examiners.
The general trend that higher volume examiners issue less litigated patents
while lower volume examiners issue more than expected litigated patents also
holds true for secondary examiners, albeit to a lesser extent. As shown in
Figure 5, the magnitude of this result is less significant when applied to
secondary examiners. This may be unsurprising because the population of
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secondary examiners is self-selecting. That is, those examiners who have the
most experience will become primary examiners. Accordingly, the population
of highly experienced secondary examiners is small.
Figure5
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E. Segmentation by Years of Service
The data was then segmented into the primary and secondary examiners by
years of service. Accordingly, Figures 6 and 7 depict litigated patents by
primary and secondary examiners segmented by the number of years of service
at the PTO when the patent was litigated. 109
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 6, it was not the primary examiners with
the least experience (less than 2 years) who were issuing the highest number of
litigated patents. The examiners with 3-6 years of experience were issuing a
disproportionate number of litigated patents. One explanation could be that
when an examiner first becomes a primary examiner, the examiner is still under
review.
To obtain permanent full signatory authority, an examiner must first go
through a four-step program: (1) the examiner is granted temporary partial
signatory authority, (2) the examiner is granted permanent partial signatory

109. Years of service means issuing at least one patent per calendar year. To determine
total years of service, we simply totaled lip the total number of years where the examiner
issued at least one patent per calendar year.
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authority, (3) the examiner is granted temporary full signatory authority, and
finally (4) the examiner is granted permanent full signatory authority.
This
partial signatory authority process takes at least 13 bi-weeks, or approximately
six months, but could take more time depending on whether the examiner
wishes to move to the next phase. When the partial signatory program is
complete, then the examiner can be granted temporary full signatory authority.
Again, the process to move from temporary full signatory authority to
permanent full signatory authority can take more than six months to complete.
Additionally, when an examiner has partial signatory authority or temporary
full signatory authority, that examiner undergoes more scrutiny. Accordingly,
the additional scrutiny during the first few years as a primary examiner could
act as a gatekeeper for litigated patents.
Figure6
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In contrast, primary examiners who have permanent full signatory
authority (usually years 3 and above) are no longer heavily scrutinized.
Compounding this problem is the fact that production rates increase when
primary examiners acquire full signatory authority (usually an examiner moves
to a GS-14 after gaining permanent full signatory status). Specifically, when
examiners move to GS-14, they are usually required to produce at least 135%
over the GS-12 benchmark.1 11 Thus, new primary examiners who have

110. See also supra Part I.B.
iii. Additionally, there are other programs that could increase both the pay rate and the
production requirements of a primary examiner with permanent full signatory authority. For
example, "Expert Level" rating will raise an examiner to a GS-15 level and require 150% of
the GS-12 production numbers. Additionally, a "Senior Level" rating will raise an examiner
to a GS-15 level and require 40% of the GS-12 production numbers. Finally, a "Generalist"
or "Ph.D." credit can raise the full signatory authority examiner to a GS-15 level but will
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permanent full signatory authority are in the new position of increased
production rates while experiencing reduced supervision. Accordingly, these
primary examiners (usually with more than 2-3 years of experience as a
primary examiner) may issue those applications on their docket that they would
have been hesitant to allow beforehand. This phenomenon is supported by the
fact that these applications that are "on the fence" might be more litigated than
most patents. This is because strong patents could be allowed quickly by the
examiner, and competitors would most likely need to license these patents,
thereby avoiding litigation. Correspondingly, weak patents might take longer to
issue, but would most likely not be litigated because of their weak standing.
However, applications where validity is unclear may require litigation. These
unclear applications may be issued at a higher rate when the primary examiner
first receives full signatory authority (without supervision), thereby explaining
the higher litigation rates in years 3-6. This112explanation would comport with
the selection bias described by Priest-Klein.
Interestingly, primary examiners in years 4-6 steadily decrease the number
of litigated patents they issue. This could be because the numbers of unclear
applications are depleted from their docket. Alternatively, primary examiners
with more experience may be simply getting better at filtering out
commercially valuable patents as discussed in Part IV.B above. Most likely, it
is a combination of these two factors.
As shown in Figure 7, secondary examiners issue litigated patents by
experience almost exactly as expected. That is, secondary examiners issue
litigated patents as a function of percentage patents issued. Again, the
population of secondary examiners who have more than five years of
experience is self-excluding because the most experienced secondary
examiners are most likely to become primary examiners.

keep the examiner at 135% of the GS-12 production numbers. These programs can take one
to five years to clear before credit is given.
112. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); George Priest, Selective Characteristicsof Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399 (1980).

538

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:507
Figure 7
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F. Segmentation by Technology Centers
We segmented the data by specific technology centers in Appendix A. For
example, Figure 8 represents the number of litigated patents from Technology
Center 3700 (Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing and Products). Although
not all points along the spectrum are significant, the general trend holds true.
Specifically, (1) examiners who issue patents at a lower rate are issuing
litigated patents at a rate similar to random chance, (2) examiners who issue
patents at a higher rate issue litigated patents at a lower than expected rate, and
(3) those examiners who issue between 50 and 75 patents per year issue
litigated patents at a higher than expected rate.
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G. Segmentation by Workgroup
Finally, we segmented the data by workgroup, focusing on those
workgroups that contained a disproportionate number of litigated patents. We
found some workgroups that could be targeted for secondary review, thereby
possibly lowering the issuance of litigated patents. Targeting specific
workgroups and examiners within these specific workgroups for secondary
review may be a cost effective means to decrease the number of litigated
patents issued by the Patent Office.
One example is Workgroup 2610 (Digital Communications, General
Communications, Optical Communications, Telephony, Audio, Multiplex
Communications, Cellular Telephony, Radio, and Satellite Communications) in
Technology Center 2600 (Computer Architecture, Software and Information
Security). The total number of litigated patents in Technology Center 2600 is
shown in Figure 9a. Interestingly, many of the litigated patents are coming
from W~orkgroup 2610, which encompasses digital communications, Figure 9b.
More specifically, many of these litigated patents are coming from examiners
who issue on average between 55 and 70 patents per year. One solution may be
to target these examiners for quality review more frequently to ensure quality
control.
A second example is Workgroup 3720 ! 1 (Manufacturing Devices and
Processes, Machine Tools, and Hand Tools) in Technology Center 3700
(Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing and Products). The total number of

113. Art Units 3721 (Sheet Material Container Making, Package Making, Elongated
Member Driving, Tool Driving or Impacting) and 3728 (Shoes, Special Receptacle or
Package) are not included in this workgroup because they are included in Workgroup 3713
(Sheet Container Making, Package Making, Receptacles Shoes, Apparel, and Tool Driving
or Impacting).
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litigated patents in Technology Center 3700 is shown in Figure 10a. Many of
these litigated patents are coming from Workgroup 3720. It is difficult to
specifically target one particular group (by volume) of examiners in this
workgroup. However, all patents issued from 3720 could be reviewed at a
higher rate for quality control because this workgroup is issuing litigated
patents at a higher rate.
Figure 9a
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Figure 9b
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Figure l0a
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Figure10b
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H. Possible Solutions

As with any descriptive study, it is difficult to make causal links. As
described above, there are many situations where litigation could not be
avoided by measures taken by the PTO. Each of the solutions below is based on
the implication that there is a causal link between examiners and litigation,
which may not be the case. Thus, if we assume that many of these litigations
could have been prevented by examiners at the FfO level, then there are
solutions that may be implemented to increase patent quality.
One solution to lower the number of litigated patents may be to create a
two-track specialization system for patent examiners. This may allow the PTO
to simulate the experience of one 10+ year examiner in a much shorter amount
of time. A division of labor where one group of examiners specializes in prior
art searching, while another group of examiners specializes in drafting office
actions could mimic the specialization of one senior examiner in a much shorter
timeframe. This solution would not only help the backlog of RCEs, but also
help the general backlog of unexamined patent applications.
Specifically, the first track (1) would be a prior art searching track, and the
second track (2) would be an office action generation track. Prior art searching
examiners would specialize and have sole responsibility for completing prior
art searching. This would allow some examiners to deeply specialize in creating
targeted keyword searches for a variety of different inventions within the same
art unit or workgroup. The second track would consist of office action
generation, based in large part on the results gathered from the prior art
searchers. Office action generation examiners would specialize in
understanding the relevant patent law and would have sole responsibility for
composing complete office actions that correctly apply the law. This would
allow specialization in the writing skills necessary to convey clear rejections.
Patent examiners (or their supervisors) would choose which track to go
into when moving from a secondary examiner to a primary examiner. This
would allow examiners to specialize in those skills that are best suited for the
specific examiner, thus allowing for better rejections with clearly written office
actions. Specialization should also decrease the workload per examiner, and
result in faster and more efficient application processing rates.
Additionally, this two-track system would combat the incomplete or
piecemeal search by examiners in the first action, with a more complete search
in the "final" action. Patent quality should increase because relevant prior art
would be determined in the first instance. Additionally, prosecution times
would decrease because office actions would be written in a clear and coherent
manner on relevant patent laws such that applicants could determine the real
issues at hand. Applicants would be able to identify the precise points of
rejection so that the applicant could provide well-targeted responses. In general,
there may be an increase in "quality" patents because relevant art would be
found and clear rejections would be written. Prosecution histories would be
clearer, and in litigation those issues that had been previously vetted by the
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examiner would be distinct.
There are several possible limitations with this two track system. Foremost,
this division of labor would limit the "office action generation" examiners'
knowledge of the relevant prior art, and therefore dull their ability to gauge the
novelty / non-obviousness of the invention.
The Japanese Patent Office (JPO) has embraced a variation of this model
by outsourcing its prior art searches. 114 About 65% of all examined applications
in 2010 (about 246,000 applications) were searched using an outsourced search
company. 1 15 This outsourced search cost the JPO approximately $236 million,
which represents approximately 40% of the direct cost of patent
examination. 116 Interestingly, a study done by Yamauchi and Nagoka has
shown that outsourcing the prior art search led to decreased appeals against
rejection decisions as well as increased speed of examination. 117 Although
most of the outsourced applications did not deal with "complex" technologies,
Yamauchi and Nagoka argue that this outsourcing
has led to not only increased
1 18
speed, but also increased patent quality.
A second possible solution to increase the number of "quality" patents
would be to increase the number of experienced examiners. These data suggest
that one way to increase the number of "quality" patents is to retain patent
examiners to leverage their higher experience levels. A previous report has
shown that the percentage of examiners with less than three years' experience
has grown from less than 50% in 1996 to about 80% in 2009.119 In contrast, the
percentage of examiners with ten or more years of experience has decreased
from 20% to less than 10% in the same period. These data are particularly
disturbing in light of the fact that it takes approximately three years for an
examiner to become proficient at searching and familiar with the nuances of
patent law.
Finally, a third possible solution to decrease the number of litigated patents
would be to increase the length of time primary examiners are supervised.
Alternatively, full signatory authority might be given only after the sixth year
as a primary examiner. This solution may, however, only simply delay the
number of litigated patents to a period of time when the primary examiner
becomes independent.

114. Isanu Yamauchi & Sadao Nagaoka, Does the Outsourcing of Prior Art Search
Increase the Efficiency of Patent Examination? (Institute of Innovation Research,
Fitotsubashi Univ., Working Paper WP#13-12, 2013).
115. Id.at 2.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id.
119. Dennis Crouch, Patent Examiner Experience Levels, PATENTLYO (Feb. 5, 2010),
http:/ /www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010 02/patent-examiner-experience-levels.html.
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V

CONCLUSIONS

Patent litigation goes to the heart of the incentive structure established by
the patent system. However, patent litigation is costly and time consuming. As
discussed in Part I, previous studies have focused on patent characteristics that
may lead to an increased chance of litigation. However, few studies have
focused on examiner characteristics that may lead to an increased likelihood of
litigation.
This study suggests that not all patent examiners issue litigated patents at
the same rate. As an initial matter, when we segment the data by secondary
examiner, we find that secondary examiners are issuing litigated patents at
approximately the expected rate. In contrast, when we segment the data by
primary examiners, we find that primary examiners, who have 3-6 years of
experience or issue on average between 45 and 65 patents per year, issue
litigated patents at a higher rate than expected. Furthermore, certain
workgroups within specific technology centers issue litigated patents at higher
rates than other workgroups. These data suggest that some groups of examiners
and some workgroups should be scrutinized more heavily before allowing
applications to issue as patents.
Interestingly, primary examiners who issue patents at the highest rate and
have the most years of experience are issuing litigated patents at a much lower
than expected rate. One explanation is that this population of examiners is
better able to quickly filter out commercially valuable patents. Alternatively, it
could be that this population of examiners is simply better able to determine
those claims that are too broad in scope, and/or do not meet the patentability
standards.
Finally, we note that there are many reasons why firms choose to engage in
patent litigation. However, some litigations are baseless and do not result in
invalidation of the patent. Thus, simply filing a patent suit may not be the ideal
measure of patent quality. To address this issue, we are currently creating a
database that contains every patent that was litigated to final judgment from
2010-2011. However, the major limitation to this new database is that the
power is greatly reduced because sample size is diminished (from
approximately 15,000 to approximately 300).
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